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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND ITS
PROSPECTS
DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ*
State constitutions create the legal frameworks in which many of the basic
regulatory decisions affecting American citizens' lives are made. Yet, the
institutional processes and decisionmaking structures affecting, and affected by,
state constitutions in modem American law are scarcely studied by constitutional
lawyers. Accordingly, there is precious little discussion in the literature on
constitutional theory and interpretation about state constitutions as separate objects
of inquiry. To be sure, there was a brief burst of normative attention on state
constitutions two decades ago. The occasion for this attention was the avowedly
strategic effort led by Justice William Brennan twenty years ago to highlight the
value of plumbing the states for individual rights protections in the face of
conservative retrenchment.'
With hindsight, though, the revolution in state constitutional theory touted by
prominent state jurists,2 by liberal law professors despairing of the Reagan-Bush
era, 3 and of Justice Brennan himself,4 has not lasted. Notwithstanding the highly
touted turn toward state constitutional discourse of the past two decades, the results
have been disappointing. Yet, the renaissance of state constitutional law hardly
influenced currents of constitutional theory with respect to fundamental issues of
constitutional structure or even interpretation. On the whole, contributions by
constitutional theorists to state constitutional theory have been rather modest. State
constitutional theory remains a rather barren, mundane field, with little substantive
controversy, creative thinking, or paradigm-shaking.5
This is an unfortunate state of affairs, for state constitutions are not only
intrinsically important as legal frameworks for the implementation of public policy
throughout all fifty of the states, but they are also especially fertile objects of
inquiry for theoretical discussion of the key issues in American public law. By
* Dean, University of San Diego School of Law; formerly Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California-Berkeley.
1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977). See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutionsas Guardians of IndividualRights, 61 N.Y.U. L REV. 535 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L REV. 1 (1995); Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions-Alive and Well, 61 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 381 (1987); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1081 (1985); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985); Hans A. Linde, First Things First:Rediscovering the States'
Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
3. Paul Kahn describes the renaissance of state constitutionalism as reflecting "a kind of forum shopping
for liberals." Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalismand the Problems of Fairness,30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 464
(1996). See also Lawrence G. Sager, Forward: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules
of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L REV. 959 (1985); Laurence Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The
New FederalismandAffirmative Rights to EssentialGovernmentalServices, 90 HARV. L REV. 1065 (1977); Frank
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutationsof 'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
4. See generally Brennan, supra note 1.
5. This is less true of a field which is, in some ways, a sub-field of state constitutional law, that is, local
government law. Curiously, though, local government scholars have seldom examined seriously the intersections
among local government law and politics and state constitutionalism and constitutional law. See, e.g., CLAYTON
P. GiLETrE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1995). But see Richard Briffault, Localism in State ConstitutionalLaw,
496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 117 (1988).
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understanding state constitutions and state constitutionalism, we can better understand the processes in which fundamental sub-national decisions are and should be
made. Moreover, coming to terms with the law, politics, and economics of modem
federalism requires, as I have suggested elsewhere, 6 coming to terms with the
intrastate aspects of law and politics. And the basic framework within which
intrastate governmental decisionmaking is made is the constitution of the state.
Reading the scholarly literature on constitutional law and theory, one would
suppose that state constitutionalism is a relatively minor element of the American
constitutional order.7 In reviewing writings on state constitutionalism in the mid1980s, prominent appellate lawyer John Frank describes state constitutional law as
too-often "a sort of pallid me-tooism."8 More recently, constitutional lawyers have
attacked more directly the notion of an independent state constitutionalism,9
suggesting that intellectual "discourse" at the state level has decisively "failed."
Whether or not these attacks hit the mark, one of the most arresting features of
modem state constitutional jurisprudence is that there are no distinct theoretical
paradigms that shape state constitutional theory. We borrow whole cloth from
federal constitutional theory when we interpret state constitutions. And while debate
rages about the extent to which state constitutional provisions involving rights ought
to be interpreted independently of, or in lockstep with, equivalent federal
provisions,' ° the basic approaches we use in addressing the question are drawn from
traditions of national constitutionalism and national constitutional theory. This is
so notwithstanding the fact that state constitutions differ fundamentally from the
federal constitution in their respective histories, their political theories, and the
intra-state circumstances to which they respond, if imperfectly, as instruments of
public governance.
This is reason alone to find disconcerting the dearth of creative analysis
concerning state constitutionalism and state constitutional theory. However, there
is an additional reason, particular to current events, to care about the domain of
state constitutional theory. The so-called "devolution revolution" has resulted in a
substantial retreat by the federal government in American public policymaking'

6. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning FederalismInside Out: IntrastateAspects of Interstate
Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1996).
7. By contrast, within the space of a few years in the early to mid-1980s, there was a substantial amount
of commentary in the legal literature on state constitutionalism and state constitutional theory. See, e.g,, Symposium
on the Revolution in State ConstitutionalLaw, 13 VT. L REV. 11-346 (1988); Symposium: The Bicentennialof
the United States Constitution, 61 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 379-472 (1986) (collecting articles on state constitutional
law); Symposium: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L REV. 959-1318 (1985)[hereinafter Texas
Symposium]; Developments in the aw-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L REV.
1324-1502 (1982) [hereinafter Harvard Developments].
8. See John P. Frank, Symposium: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L REV. 1339,
1340 (1985) (book review).
9. See generallyJames A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MicH. L REV.
761 (1992). For a more measured, and, for that among other reasons, more insightful analysis of state constitutional
theory and its failings, see Paul W. Kahn, InterpretationandAuthority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L
REV. 1147 (1993). See also Kahn, supranote 3.
10. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, State ConstitutionalInterpretationand Methodology, 28 N.M. L REV. 199,
199-200 (1998); HarvardDevelopments, supra note 7, at 1332-47.
11. See generally Symposium Issue: Constructing a New Federalism:JurisdictionalCompetence and
Competition, 14 YA J. REG. 1-503 (1996). On the legal aspects of this devolution, with particular focus on the
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The role of state and local institutions in public policy has been augmented
accordingly. To the extent that intrastate decisionmaking takes place within the
context of state constitutions and their respective constitutional law, the pertinence
of state constitutionalism seems unavoidable, and even urgent.
Above, I have explained why state constitutions are important. But is there a role
for a distinct discourse of state constitutionalism and state constitutional theory?
This asks a different question than that put forth by those who counseled in the
1970s and 80s a renaissance of state constitutional law as a source of individual
rights protections. 2 Is there anything theoretically special about state
constitutionalism beyond the availability of state constitutions as a source of rights
and liberties? The aim of this essay is to suggest that yes, indeed, there is a special
place for state constitutional theory within the framework of American
constitutionalism. There is both a weak and a strong case for distinctive discourse.
The weak case is built on the essentially positive insight that there are salient
differences between state and national constitutional processes. These differences
represent not merely distinct ways of phrasing the same essential structures and
rights provisions. Rather, the differences go the heart of distinct principles of how
to structure the processes of government, and how to allocate to legislative and
executive institutions the powers of governance. Moreover, these differences
counsel the development of a separate prescriptive discourse. While it may be that
constitutional theory could incorporate these differences into a more general
framework, modem currents in constitutional theory do not, as suggested below,
engage state constitutions as independent objects of inquiry. Modem constitutional
theory is, in the main, nationalconstitutional theory.
The strong case for a distinct constitutional theory rests upon a vision of state
constitutions and state governance within the American constitutional system.
States are not political islands unto themselves. They are units of government within
a diffuse yet united states. The union of states has, as suggested in the ever-growing
literature on American federalism, certain political and economic aims. The
accomplishment of these aims requires attentiveness to the national/state
relationship to be sure. However, it also requires attention to the ways in which
states structure their own processes of governance. When we are attentive to these
processes, we see that state constitutions can and do perform very distinct
regulatory roles. A principal role, as described in more detail below, is the
facilitation of strategies of intrastate governance, and, in particular, the design of
intrastate institutional mechanisms that enable differentiated local communities to
flourish economically, politically, and socially. 3 A related role is the facilitation of
each state's capacity to compete in an interstate (and increasingly global) economic
marketplace. 4 In essence, then, the strong case for state constitutional theory as an
independent discourse is that it enables us to fix our energies more closely on the
distinct roles of state constitutions in a federal system.

Court's recent commerce jurisprudence, see Robert Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L REV.
643 (1996). See also United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12. See supra notes 2-3 and sources cited therein.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 146-50.
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In Part I, I consider some of the elements that illustrate the differences between
state and national constitutional processes. The focus is on the structural
relationships between levels of government in both systems, for it is with respect
to these relationships that we traditionally build the base of a coherent theory of
constitutionalism. The discussion in Part II centers on currents of federal
constitutional theory and its relevance to issues of state constitutionalism. In Part
II, I turn to a discussion of state constitutional discourse as a distinct phenomenon.
With reference, again, to structural elements of state and national constitutionalism,
I consider whether some of the key predicaments of state constitutionalism counsel
a more particularized theoretical approach. At the end of Part III, I sketch some of
the issues that this state-focused theoretical approach would confront.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS DISTINCT PROCESSES
American constitutional theory is built around a rather mythic obsession with the
American constitutional tradition as framed by the creation of the republic in the
late 18th century. The founding of the republic represents the story that, in the
myriad of ways in which it is told, frames the normative enterprise of constitutional
theorists. These theorists aim to provide not only retail guidelines to interpreting
difficult provisions, but, more grandly, to provide a rich theoretical vocabulary for
understanding the relationship between legal ideology, judicial doctrine, American
political history, and the normative foundations of constitutional interpretation. In
short, the object is to provide a theory of American constitutionalism, and not
merely constitutionalism more generally.
This poses a problem for the enterprise of state constitutional theory. It may well
be the case that the same sets of doctrinal puzzles and prescriptive agendas animate
debates in state constitutional law and politics, and that the resonant positive story
told about American constitutionism circa 1787 and beyond can adequately frame
our understanding of the states' respective constitutional experiences. However,
given the particularized focus in mainstream constitutional theory on the American
constitutional experience at large, it is not obvious that federal constitutional
history, structure, and theory provides an adequate template for state constitutional
theory. Rather, it is more likely that the similarities are obscured by the salient
differences. Or at least this is the thesis of the discussion below.
ConstitutionalFormation and the FederalAnalogy
American state constitutions are fifty separate documents shaped over the course
of two centuries. 5 All'but the original thirteen states came into the union with their
constitutions after the establishment of the national constitution. For these original,
pre-1787 state constitutions, much of the basic architecture looks rather like that of
the United States Constitution. Moreover, many of these post-1787 state
constitutions track, in important respects, national constitutional discourse, from the
establishment in each document of a separation of powers and, in all but one, a
bicameral state legislature. They also each embody a bill of rights, containing
A.

15. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, 31 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3 (1996-97 ed.).
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collections of rights which are at least as protective of individual liberty as those6
embodied in the national constitution and are, more commonly, more protective.'
This structural equivalence is not surprising. We should fully expect that the 18th
century constitutional discourse in the country would have incorporated principles
and theories applicable to both federal and state constitutions of the time. 7 There
are two related reasons why this is so. First, the structure of government within the
states whose constitutions were adopted contemporaneously with, or after, the
national constitution of 1787, trace, in fundamentals, the structure of government
detailed by the framers of our national constitution. With respect to the design of
institutional relationships, not only does each state constitution maintain a system
of separation of powers, but each separation of powers arrangement tracks the
tripartite division of powers in exactly the same way, at least on paper, as does the
national constitution.18 Thus, each state constitution distributes powers to an elected
legislature and chief executive; and each maintains a judiciary, albeit one whose
selection and retention is constituted in profoundly different ways than the
"independent" judiciary of the U.S. Constitution. 9 Similarly, each state constitution
maintains a system of judicial review,' of judicial supremacy,2" and of limits on the
scope of delegation to institutions outside the three branches of state government.
While there is nothing in the United States Constitution that appears to require these
analogous arrangements,' state constitutions mirror in many fundamental ways the
structure apparatus of legislative, executive, and judicial powers delineated in the
national constitution of 1787.
Second, our governmental structure may have grown out of a general, theoretical
sense of proper institutional arrangements which would, naturally, be folded in both
state and national constitutional orders. The framers of the constitutions of our first
states were, like the founding fathers of our national constitution, students of the
political theory of the day.23 The discussion of political and constitutional
fundamentals in the writings of Locke, Hume, Burke, and Montesquieu, discussions
which formed the baseboards of the founding fathers' constitutional theory, did not
distinguish for the most part between intra-national and national systems.2
Federalism was the essential puzzle in the framers' national constitutional design,
and it was with respect to forging a satisfactory set of federalism principles that the

16. See, e.g., Note, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State Constitutions, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1321-23
nn.4-5 (1985) (describing examples of state constitutional rights provisions which go beyond federal protections).
17.

See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIc, 1776-1787 125-255 (1969).

18. See id. at 150-61.
19. See Harvard Developments, supra note 7, at 1351-53. See also STATE SUPREME COURTS:
POLICYMAKING INTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).
20. See generally William Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of
ConstitutionalTheory in the States 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L REV. 1166 (1972). See also WOOD, supra note 17,
at 453-63.
21. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1170-73.
22. It may be argued, however, that the so-called "guarantee clause," in requiring the states to provide to
their citizens a republican form of government, mandates a series of structural arrangements in the states that are
identical to the national government. However, no state or federal court has so held.
23. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967);
DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS (T. Colbourn ed., 1974).
24. See WOOD, supra note 17, at 127-61.
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framers' were particularly creative and original.' Yet, with regard to other elements
of constitutional design, including the division of powers, electoral procedures, and
the scope of individual rights, there were theoretical connections between the
political theory of the framers' inspirators and the needs and wants of the state
constitutions' architects. The point is that the adoption of the basic rudiments of
government design in the state constitutions adopted contemporaneously with the
national constitution suggests that a similar understanding of American
constitutionalism-an understanding borne of a similarly redolent political
theory-informed both state and national constitutional processes of the time.2 6
The matter looks different, though, when we consider the processes of state
constitution-building in the century-and-a-half following the adoption of the
national constitution. Here, the role of the national constitution as template is not
altogether obvious; nor did the United States Constitution restrict, except in
particular instances,27 the prerogatives of states to construct their own fundamental
charter of government. Most state constitutions were adopted after-and, in a
majority of instances, substantiallyafter--the U.S. Constitution.'h Each constitution
has its own discrete history; many states have, over the course of their own
histories, gone through periods of substantial political crises and constitutional
upheaval. In contrast to the national constitution, the experience of state constitution
formation and adaptation has followed a much more eclectic and unstable path.
Amendments through direct initiatives and through constitutional conventions,
while unheard of at the federal level, are a commonplace in the various states'
constitutional experience. Indeed, most state constitutions did not sprint forth fully
formed by a momentous framing experience, but are, instead, documents whose
structures have been patched together through periods of change and reconstruction.
In many cases, this change has taken the form of overall reconstruction; more
than a judicially generated constitutional "moment,"29 these reconstructions
represented the state's overhauling of basic principles and institutional
arrangements. While American constitutionalism is described as being rather
distinct from other systems in the world, systems in which constitutions are
frequently amended, the experience of state constitutional change in the United
States reveals that state constitutionalism is fluid, dynamic, and even unstable.

25. See JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLmCS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
161-202 (1996).
26. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE
MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1980); Robert F. Williams, "Experience

Must Be Our Only Guide": The State Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15
HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 403 (1988).

27. These instances entail basically the limits on state power under the federal constitution. In addition to
the rights guaranteed by the first ten amendments, there are curtailments in the structure of the Constitution that,
at the very beginning, circumscribed the prerogatives of states to act in defiance of federal constitutional strictures.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.I(privileges & immunities clause). For our purposes, it is not important to
distinguish between limits imposed directly on states in the United States Constitution, and tacit limits which grow
out of authority granted in the Constitution to the federal government, for example, the so-called "dormant"
commerce clause. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 15, at 3
29. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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When state constitutions do undergo change and revision, the adaptations do not
go in the direction of adopting federal constitutional forms; nor do state
constitutions change in order to bring them into line with extant federal
constitutional doctrine. They change, to put the point very broadly, because of the
will of the legislators and voters of the state to reconstruct intrastate political and
legal institutions. Retail changes frequently take the form of new (or curtailed)
rights protections;3 ° more structural changes redesign, for example, the system of
state and local finance and the authority of intrastate political institutions to enact
policy, raise and spend money, and carry out their electoral responsibilities.3 ' We
can hardly generalize about the sources and motivations of the multiplicity of state
constitutional adaptations over two centuries; and no constitutional historian, to my
knowledge, tries to. Instead, stories told about state constitutional change are
appropriately localized, contextualized, and interestingly differentiated from the
various stories told about the origins of the national constitution of 1787 and of the
32
(rare) changes to that document in the two centuries following its enactment.
Why doesn't state constitutional adaptation follow in some coherent form the
template of federal constitutionalism? We might leave it with the observation that
states are entitled to act differently from the nation as a whole, and so they do. But
there is a more interesting explanation, one grounded in the most fundamental
distinction between state constitutionalism and national constitutionalism. This is
the distinction drawn between state constitutions as documents of limits and the
federal constitution as a document of grant.33
B.

Straining the Analogy: On the Structure of GovernmentalPowers under
State Constitutions
The most fundamental structural difference between the scope of delegated
powers under the national constitution and the state constitutions is this: State
constitutions are documents of limits, while the federal constitution is a document
of grant.34 In other words, state governments can exercise all those powers not
prohibited to them under their constitutions or other limits imposed by the national
constitution. By contrast, the national government must find in the United States
Constitution a delegation, whether express or implied, 5 of power to act. It is from
this principle that we get the idea of a state police power, a power not possessed by
the federal government in the United States Constitution. 6

30. See Harvard Developments, supra note 7, at 1353-56 ("[S]tate constitutions often guarantee substantive
rights in terms far broader than even the federal Constitution's most expansive protections.").
31. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XII(A).
32. One key distinguishing feature in the state constitutional process is the role of the initiative system. The
initiative system provides greater mechanisms and opportunities for constitutional change. See, e.g., DAVID
MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984).

33. See HarvardDevelopments, supra note 7, at 1326-31.
34. See e.g., Hombeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Howard McBain, The
Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L REV. 190 (1916).

35. This caveat is necessary, of course, because of the United States Supreme Court's first, and still most
significant, statement regarding the issue of whether the federal government's limited powers must be the product
of express delegation. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819).
36. But see Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 347-53 (1903) (suggesting that the commerce clause
authorizes the national government to exercise what is tantamount to a national police power).
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Does anything turn on this theoretical distinction? The notion of the state police
power expresses the core idea of the state legislative and executive power under
principles of state constitutionalism, which is that state political entities may
exercise all powers (except as limited by the national constitution) necessary to
carry out state goals." Those goals are, of course, to be defined by state political
institutions, including the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. From the perspective of constitutional theory more generally, this principle
is both peculiar and fundamental. It is peculiar to lawyers steeped in the American
national constitutional tradition. The basic idea there is that the federal government
has limited powers. 8 The states' police power and the corollary that state constitutions are documents of limit,39 not grant, is the direct reverse of this. It is fundamental, for it tends to construct the system of state decisionmaking around the
ideology of political discretion and choice, rather than around an ideology of the
rule of law.' °
The essential object of inquiry in the federal constitution's structural framework
is the description of how powers are allocated by the constitution to the national
4
government. The recurrent question is: What is the source of national authority? '
By contrast, the object of inquiry in state constitutionalism is describing the source
of the limits on state power under the state constitution.
To see how this is just so, consider the constitutional relationship among state
political institutions and local governments. Whereas states occupy an essential role
in the American constitutional system, there is no equivalent principle of federalism
(or "localism") in state constitutionalism. 42 Local governments are creatures of the
state.43 The basic arrangement of intrastate government is the product of state-bystate choices about how to construct an appropriate system of state government."

37. See id. at 347.
38. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
39. See id. at 374 (noting that state governments may exercise power not "expressly forbidden" by their
constitutions).
40. Of course, the state may be constrained by particular constitutional provisions in a way which ultimately
and firmly limits the scope of discretion and choice in political decisionmaking. Nothing in the notion of a state
police power, after all, means that this power cannot be constrained by constitutional rules. See id. But surely the
tendencies to so limit the states' powers are less in a constitutional framework within which state action need not
be taken pursuant to a constitutional grant of power.
41. See id. at 402-04 (discussing whether federal power emanates from the people or the states).
42. The term "localism" has confused things somewhat by borrowing an analogy from discourse about
federalism. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L REV. 1 (1990); Briffault, supra note 5. Federalism expresses not merely, or even especially, a principle
about national-state relations, but rather, a core constitutional principle of power allocation. See DAVID L SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 108-18 (1995). Perhaps critics of federalism are correct in regarding the concept of
federalism as anachronistic in the modern administrative state. See Edward L Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 903-09 (1994). Or perhaps they are
wrong. See Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power,73 VA. L REV. 1387 (arguing that
federal power under the commerce clause is narrower than modern judicial interpretation). In any event, tying
federalism as a constitutional principle to questions of national/state economic, political, and social relations
requires a substantive argument. Likewise, insisting that there is something called our "localism" which describes
the relationship between local governments and the states requires not only a political and economic argument for
local prerogatives and power, but also a coherent political theory that explains why localism is properly a part of
state constitutionalism.
43. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); GJ.JErrE,supra note 5, at 209-28.
44. See, e.g., NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN
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In the most extreme case, states can dismantle local governments altogether; in the
more usual case, states create schemes for establishing, augmenting, and shrinking
local governments' powers as circumstances change.45 Even where the existence of
certain municipal units, such as counties, are assured in the state constitution, it is
left to the legislature to establish the scope and limits of those powers to be
exercised by these units. This essential dependence of local governments on state
legislative authority is a truism of state constitutional law.'
This is in profound contrast to the structure of the American federal system under
the United States Constitution. States, in our system, are exogenous data; they are
taken as given for the purposes of governmental organization.' It may well be the
case that states have outlived their usefulness as components of regulatory
administration in the modern administrative state. 48 Yet, however contingent or
central we wish to regard the American states as a matter of constitutional history
or normative theory, no one supposes that states are creatures of the national
government, subject to the deconstruction by same and the reorganization into more
functional administrative units.49 At least no one supposes as much under our
current theories of American constitutionalism.'
Insofar as the matter within state constitutionalism is of a wholly different
conceptual dimension, the plethora of legal questions raised by state/local conflicts
in the fifty states occupy a fundamentally different conceptual ground than the
enduring questions of federalism that are part of the structure of constitutionalism
at the national level. First, and most obviously, the nature of the political
relationships between states and their local governments are necessarily quite
different from the national/state relationship under American federalism. Not only
does the principle of limited government and delegated powers represent this
difference, but the insurance indicated by the Tenth Amendment's guarantee of

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994). I do not mean, however, to overstate the extent to which these state/local
arrangements are the product of rational political choice. On the historically contingent nature of state/local
relations, see generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE

CITY OF NEW YORK INAMERICAN LAW 1730-1870 (1983); Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal
Corporation:A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1985) (tracing the development of modem
American municipal law from its origins in English corporate law).
45. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 42, at 113-14.
46. This is not a necessary truism, to be sure, but one that describes the reality of state constitutional
arrangements. See id. at 7. Surely a state could decide, in its own constitution, to establish a fixed series of local
government units and to distribute a range of powers to those units. Municipal home rule functions somewhat like
this. See id. at 10-12.
47. See Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 152-53 (discussing intractability of states' existence within the federal
order).
48. See, e.g., Edward L Rubin, The Fundamentalityand Irrelevance of Federalism,13 GA. ST. U. L REV.
1009, 1060-62 (1997); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 42, at 908-09.
. 49. This is so whether we believe, with Justice Thomas' dissent in United States Term Limits, Inc.
v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), that states were the engines behind the creation of the constitutional republic and
were, thereby, the proper locus for reserved powers, or whether we believe, with Justice Stevens, that the
Constitution was created because of, and in the name of, "we the people." See id at 846-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
& 803. See generally SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE ANATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERAISM 30840 (1993) (discussing sovereignty issues in the ratification of the Constitution).
50. See generally Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 MINN. L REV. 317 (1997) (discussing the
centralization of power and the need to value federalism); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND.
L. REV. 1485 (1994) (examining the effect of political institutions and shifting social culture on federalism).
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a truism or a substantive, enforceable
reserved powers 5 -whether
52 -reflects at least some degree of political empowerment of the states.
constraint
By contrast, this empowerment is essentially lacking at the state/local level.
However, more turns on this distinction than the quite practical issues concerning
the political and legal structure of local governments within state constitutional
systems. The dependence of local governments on state political institutions renders
moot a variety of deep normative questions that lie at the heart of constitutional
theory pertinent to the United States Constitution. For example, there is no question
that states may, within the scope of their police powers, regulate the intralocal
movement of goods, services, persons and, indeed, may enact suitable regulations
designed to control the system of commerce and commercial activities within their
borders. Moreover, the states can regulate a plethora of non-commercial activities
in the name of controlling the moral and social environment of the state (save, of
course, for whatever individual rights are secured by the state and federal
constitution). The pervasiveness of this police power makes a number of the most
persistent issues in American constitutional law, including nearly all federalismrelated issues, simply disappear as a constitutional matter. To the extent that these
issues are left to the ordinary political process, we might think of the "documents
of limit" principle as functioning as a comprehensive political question doctrine.
"Yes," it might be argued, "but the central questions of contemporary
constitutional theory concern the nature and scope of individual rights. To the
extent that theorists are preoccupied with those questions, then the structural
differences between national and state constitutionalism are rather beside the
point."5 3 To begin with, the focus on individual rights characteristic of the advocates
of a more muscular state constitutional law does not undermine in any way the
different conceptual universes occupied by state and federal constitutionalism. Key
to the enforcement of individual rights, after all, are those instruments of
government who are under their respective constitutional commands. Moreover, this
line of argument assumes, incorrectly, that there is a fundamental disjunction
between the structural issues underlying constitutionalism and constitutional theory
and issues involving individual rights. It is a fascinating feature of contemporary
constitutional discourse that nearly everyone now agrees that this disjunction
between structural and rights components of the United States Constitution is at
least overstated and, at worse, fundamentally wrong. Indeed, it is a commonplace
in modem constitutional theory debates to note the deep, mutual interdependence
of the rights and structural provisions of the Constitution.
The connections between constitutional structure and the Bill of Rights under the
United States Constitution have been elegantly and forcefully laid out in recent

51. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the state, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people").
52. See William Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment Over Two Centuries: More Than a Truism,
(manuscript on file with author, 1997); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980) (contending that the purpose of the Tenth Amendment was to allocate power between the nation
and the states).
53. See, e.g., Texas Symposium, supra note 7, at 959-1318; Note, supra note 16, at 1321-38.
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theoretical debate.54 Not surprisingly, this structure/rights connection has both a
modem "conservative" and a "liberal" spin. The "conservative" spin highlights the
significance of the framers' confidence in the Constitution's structural
arrangements, particularly federalism and the separation of powers, to protect
individual liberties and rights.55 The essence of rights-protection lay not in strategies
of activist judicial review (or, in the normative vocabulary, overreaching), but in
conscientious safeguarding of the Constitution's structure and form. For Hamilton,
of course, these structures were wholly adequate, and the Bill of Rights
unnecessary, and even dangerous. 56 But even for Madison and other important
framers, these structural arrangements would represent
the very frontline of defense
57
in threats to individual liberties and freedom.
The "liberal" spin on this rights/structure connection aims to tie together the
rejuvenated doctrines concerning federalism and separation of powers with the
imperative of protecting individual rights.5" Liberals' concern with more muscular
federalism, for example, is that this empowers states to trample on individuals'
political and civil rights. Federalism was, after all, the flag carried by opponents of
civil rights in post-Reconstruction America and in the 1950s and 60s. 59 Nonetheless,
federalism and separation of powers can be, with the right perspective in hand,
means of ensuring complementary insurance for individual rights protection. Both
structural doctrines are concerned, it is suggested, with securing a system of ordered
liberty and in facilitating citizen engagement with and participation in the processes
of American government at the national, state, and local level. Moreover, the slogan
"we the people" ought to represent more than a rallying cry for democracy; it should
instantiate as a fundamental premise of American constitutionalism the idea that
governmental arrangements are no more nor less than instruments of individual
liberties and of human flourishing through public action and participation in the
processes of government.' °
Therefore, we cannot easily sort federal and state constitutionalism into separate
issues of structure and of rights. The core difference in inter-governmental
relationships built into, respectively, federal and state constitutionalism, is an
54. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Liberty and Constitutional Architecture: The Rights-Structure Paradigm,
16 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1993); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131 (1991); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PENN. L. REv. 1513 (1991);
Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between
Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L REV. 267 (1988).
55. See Miller, supra note 54, at 90-92.
56. See THE FEDERAIST No. 84, at 364 (Charles Beard ed., 1948).
57. As Rebecca Brown explains:
On the American side of the Atlantic the primary impetus for separated powers was the
establishment and maintenance of political liberty. Them was perhaps a secondary concern for
greater efficiency in government, but clearly "[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power." In general, then, separation of powers aimed at the interconnected goals of
preventing tyranny and protecting liberty.
Brown, supra note 54, at 1533-34. The quotation within this quotation is from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
58. See the discussion in Amar, supra note 54; Brown, supra note 54.
59. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARv. L REv. 1111 (1977). See also Leuchtenburg,

supra note 52.
60. See Miller, supra note 54, and Brown supra note 54.
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important impediment to building state constitutional theory on the edifice of
national constitutional theory. The point is not that this difference makes such an
enterprise impossible, or even undesirable. Rather, the point is that a more sustained
argument is needed for such an ambition.
ConstitutionalDifferences and the Development of ConstitutionalTheory
Constitutional theory represents, in part, the process of telling a persuasive story
about the American constitutional tradition. Where theory is informed in whole or
in part by history, this story is organized, naturally, around the Constitution's
founding." Where there are other theoretical foundations in play, this story is a
more eclectic admixture of different sources, principles, and inspirations. But, in
any event, constitutional theory has a distinct context. There is a subject-the
constitution-thatis being studied. And the task of constitutional theory is not only
descriptive-"what happened"-but also interpretive.
It follows, then, that the distinctiveness of state constitutional history and
structure means that there is a distinct context for the shaping of constitutional
theory. To the extent that we are interpreting events, the salient events in state
constitutional theory are different; to the extent that we are telling stories which
entail other, non-historical processes, these processes are, I have suggested, peculiar
to state constitutionalism as a legal framework. Thus, the weak case for a distinct
constitutional discourse rests on the insight that state constitutions reflect different
processes and thus a different context. These differences call for, at the very least,
close engagement with questions concerning whether the distinctions between
federal and state constitutional processes have implications for how we ought to
interpret these documents respectively.
There is, as I suggested in the introduction, a strong case to be made for an
independent state constitutional theory. This strong case rests on a vision of state
constitutionalism in the American political and legal system. In addition to
differences in processes and contexts, there are very good reasons to pursue a
distinct state constitutional discourse. This is the theme of the next Part of this
C.

essay. Before proceeding, though, to the stronger case for an independent state

constitutional theory, we should pause to consider the question whether there is,
despite the distinctiveness of state constitutional processes, still some relevant
themes in extant federal constitutional theory. Can we address this distinctiveness
by applying prescriptive tenets of federal constitutional theory to the enterprise of
state constitutionalism?
The Relevance of FederalConstitutionalTheory
There is no one decisive theory of American constitutionalism. Nor is there a
consensus theory of constitutional interpretation. Debates continue to rage in ways
that shape the discourse of constitutional scholarship at the end of this century.62
Each contribution to the shifting debate adds to the mix of critique of extant
D.

61. See RAKOVE, supra note 25, at 3-22. See also the collected essays in FAITH AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADA]R (1974).
62. See generally the discussion in LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).
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theories and approaches and also, in the main, enhances our incomplete
understanding of the vexing, exhilarating national constitutional experience. Shared
in common among these large clusters of theories, though, is the exclusive focus on
the United States Constitution, and its history, politics, and doctrine.63 In reflecting
upon the emergence of state constitutional theory as an element in making sense of
state constitutionalism, we should pause to consider whether and to what extent
contemporary constitutional theory, which theory developed in the context of
national constitutional circumstances, sheds light on state exigencies and
experiences.
Contemporary constitutional debate often clusters around two main theoretical
projects. To the extent that these projects are especially in vogue of late, I consider
how and whether they shed light on the subject of state constitutionalism. While not
exhausting the field of modem constitutional theory, they suffice to illuminate the
theme of my discussion in this essay, which is that state constitutional theory
requires a theoretical approach tailored sensibly to the predicaments of state
constitutionalism. The first approach is what I call interpretive eclecticism, a body
of theory that confesses uncertainty in our ability to reduce constitutional
interpretation and historiography to a few essential principles or values. This cluster
of theories acknowledges the complex, multielemental characteristics of American
constitutional discourse, and thereby counsel a rich, layered approach to tackling
difficult constitutional questions." As compared with a traditional balancing
approach, which often rests on a crude cost/benefit weighing of government versus
individual values, 6 5 interpretive eclecticism aims toward sophisticated theory and
guidelines (or, at least, guidance), and thus distinguishes itself from efforts to turn
away from theory toward something more pragmatic, ad hoc, and modest.
Interpretive eclecticism is aspirational, highly sophisticated, and informed by not
only lawyer's good common sense, but by an appreciation for the interdisciplinary
(and perhaps even post-modem) sensibilities of contemporary constitutional
adjudication as a distinctly normative enterprise.
I have in mind constitutional theorists such as Philip Bobbitt, 6 Steven Shiffrin,67
Robin West, 68 Robert Post,69 Michael Klarman,7 ° Stephen Carter,71 Sanford

63. Consider, for example, Professor Laurence Tribe's seminal modem treatise on, as he titles it, "American
Constitutional Law." The focus is exclusively on the national constitution. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrUTIONAL LAW (1978).
64. See the discussion in Michael Klarman,Anti-Fidelity, 70 S. CAL. L REV. (1997); MajoritarianJudicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. (1997); Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of
ConstitutionalEvil, 65 FORD. L REV. 1739 (1997).
65. See the discussion of balancing in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in an Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
66. See PHILP BOBBrrr, CONSTrrUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONsTrrtuON (1982).
67. See Steven Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation:Away from a General Theory
ofthe FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983).
68. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1994).
69. ROBERT POST, CONSTITIMONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNrrY, MANAGEMENT (1995);
"Theories of Constitutional Interpretation" 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13 (1990).
70. See Klarman, supra note 64.
71. See Stephen Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication and Indeterminate Text: A PreliminaryDefense of an
Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.

821 (1985).
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Levinson, 72 and Richard Fallon.73 Each of these scholars, and others, have criticized
recent constitutional theory for its paucity of imagination and, at the same time, its
frequently rigid adherence to a narrow intellectual template of what constitutes
"proper" constitutional interpretation. 74 Each rejects uncritical adherence to
traditional originalism, while maintaining fidelity as a key objective in
interpretation. And each reject treating the constitution as a fixed and immutable
object of interpretation, an object which can and ought to be interpreted like any
other legal text.75 Most importantly, though, each rejects the idea that constitutional
interpretation can be reduced to few essential criteria. What is called for, instead,
is a textured approach that folds in theories of democratic decisionmaking and of
avowedly value-laden perspectives on the nature and scope of individual liberties,
and of governmental structure and inter-institutional relationships. Constitutional
interpretation is a purposive enterprise, meaning that the aim of the judge is not
merely to enforce exogenously formed limits on governmental action, but to
facilitate the maintenance of a congerie of constitutional values, such as the
enhancement of democracy and of effective public governance. 76 For some, the
enterprise of constitutional interpretation requires a hierarchy of theories in
appropriate instances. Bobbitt and Fallon, for example, counsel the elaboration and
implementation of a coherent collection of methods in tackling hard cases.77 And
even for those who, like Post and West, have in mind an overarching theme of
American constitutional ideology, the normative suggestion is to bring to the
adjudicative table an eclectic, sophisticated menu of interpretive devices.
The other approach very much in vogue in contemporary constitutional theory
is what has been called neo-originalism.7' Theories included under this approach
grow out of the originalist tradition of pedigreeing historical evidence and context
in considering how to discern framers' intentions and understandings. 79 The
intentions of the framers are both discernible and relevant to the object of
interpretation; and it is consistent with the proper role of the judge in constitutional
interpretation to implement these intentions.8 0 The scholars' related role is to
unpack systematically, these multifaceted intentions through careful attention to
American constitutional and political history."1 The "neo" in this theory reflects the
ambivalence of these theorists towards drawing solely on framers' intentions to
ground constitutional doctrine; neo-originalists aim to unpack salient historical
72. See SANFORD LEVINSON, RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (1995).

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

73. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L REV.
1189 (1987).
74. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 73; POST, supra note 69.
75. See RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDoM'S LAw (1996); LAW's EMPIRE (1986).
76. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 64.
77. See Fallon, supra note 73, at 1240-48.
78. See the discussion in KAU~1AN, supra note 62, at 160-63 (discussing neorepublicanism) and 211-21
(discussing neofederalism).
79. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 143-60
(1990).
80. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The OriginalConstitutionand Our Origins, 19 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y
251 (1996); Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalisr, 19 HARV. J.L PUB. POL'Y 283
(1996).
81. See Jack Rakove, The OriginalIntention of OriginalUnderstanding, 13 CONST. COMMEN. 159 (1996).
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understandings, to provide a more complete, historically informed body of evidence,
leavened by careful theoretical and normative analysis, in order to shape out of
traditionally value-laden debates a more grounded, and thereby more legitimate,
basis for constitutional adjudication in the areas in which history can and ought to
guide judgment.8 2
It has been said, not without cynicism, that neo-originalist approaches grow out
of liberals' and moderates' desire to recover constitutional history from
conservative originalists who, finding a sympathetic ear in the Reagan-Bush
judiciary, built what turned out to be rather conservative interpretive guidelines
upon exegeses into the intentions and beliefs of the founding fathers as they saw
them. 3 Indeed, neo-originalism has flourished in the Rehnquist court; its message
has been shaped and advocated by a collection of mostly young, conservative legal
academics in a growing body of prescriptive constitutional scholarship. 4 Whatever
the motivations for the enterprise, neo-originalist perspectives on constitutional
interpretation are filling the pages of the law reviews and are shaping, in significant
ways, the directions of mainstream constitutional theory."
Significantly, each of the theories described above are tied deliberately and
closely to the distinct American constitutional experience. Without exception, each
of these clusters of theories, constitutional eclecticism and neo-originalist theory,
86
aim to make sense of the values of the national constitution and its context. They
are most decidedly theories of constitutional interpretation; yet, they aim at more
general goals-to construct a positive and normative perspective on American
constitutionalism and its underlying values. 7 With respect to neo-originalism in
particular, the agenda is to reconstruct in a more sophisticated way, the
understandings and values of the Constitution's framers as shaped through the lens
of modem constitutional practice and, wher appropriate, contemporary
understandings. 8

82. For an exceptionally nuanced discussion of originalism and its limitations, see RAKOVE, supra note 25,
at 4-22.
83. See Richard Fallon, The Political Function of OriginalistAmbiguity, 19 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL. 487,
492 (1996) (describing originalism as "most often a political or rhetorical stalking horse for a set of substantive
positions with respect to a relatively narrow set of constitutional issues in the current age.").
84. See generally Symposium: Originalism,Democracy, and the Constitution, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL.
237 (1996).
85. See Rakove, supranote 81.
86. For recent criticisms of the use of history by constitutional scholars in the originalist tradition, see
Martin S. Flaherty, History 'Lite' in Modem American Constitutionalism,95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Cass
R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past,95 CoLUM. L REV. 601 (1995).
87. See generally Lary Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority
of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357 (Andrei Mannor ed., 1995).
88. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politicsby OtherMeans: The Original Understandingof
War Powers, 84 CAL. L REV. 167 (1996) (war powers); Michael McConnell, Originalismand the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L REV. 947 (1995) (race and the Fourteenth Amendment); The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L REV. 1409 (1990); William Michael Treanor, The
OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess,95 COLUM. L REV. 782 (1995) (takings);
William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisonersand the Origins of JudicialReview, 143 U. PA. L REV. 491
(1994) (judicial review); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994) (presidential power); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw,
79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (federalism); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The StructuralConstitution:
Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary,105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992) (separation of powers).
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In this regard, both theoretical enterprises represent a movement away from more
avowedly jurisprudential theories of interpretation. This move is significant, for it
contextualizes the process of interpretation and thereby drives a wedge between
theoretical approaches that might furnish a basis for tying together state and federal
constitutional interpretation. The principal exemplar of a more jurisprudential
approach to constitutional interpretation is Ronald Dworkin. Although Dworkin's
recent contributions have concentrated on the United States Constitution and its
judicial construction, he builds a theory of constitutional interpretation upon a
general theory of legal interpretation. 9 Indeed, he has taken great pains to point out
to his critics that his theory of constitutionalism and constitutional interpretation
joins squarely with his general theory of legal interpretation, as spelled out most
fully in Law's Empire.'u The object is not to situate constitutional interpretation in
the particulars of American constitutional history or, instead, in a positive political
theory of constitution formation in 18th century. United States.9 ' On the contrary,
Dworkin's comprehensive theoretical framework for organizing the task of legal
interpretation is generalizable, good potentially for all systems which aim for, or
instantiate presently, a set of justice principles which fall out along the lines
suggested by Dworkin.
Whatever one might think of the theory, it represents, in its coherence, an
approach to interpretation which, at least in design, could apply plausibly to issues
of state constitutionalism and state constitutional interpretation. 92 Certainly, the
ambition of interpretation as facilitating law as integrity could, if plausible, inform
the interpretation of the state constitution as a text and could infuse contemporary
state constitutional doctrine. Moreover, the nature of individual rights contained in
state constitutions are equally well suited as are federal constitutional rights, to
Dworkinian constitutional interpretation-or at least Dworkin and his adherents
offer no reasons why this should not be so.
By contrast to this conspicuous jurisprudential approach, though, mainstream
modern constitutional theory has turned more decisively toward a deep contextual
and historically infused approach. Leading contemporary constitutional theorists
represented by the cluster of theories I have traced above are determined to situate
more closely the enterprise of constitutional interpretation, and of American
constitutionalism more generally, within distinctly American constitutional politics,
histories, practices, and legal developments. What is, if anything sacrificed, in these

89. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW (1996).
90. RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986).

91. Whether or not Dworkin would agree with this assessment of his approach as jurisprudential and
historical, the separation between his object of normative inquiry and the subject of the American Constitution as
a distinct document with a distinct historical process, is well illustrated in a recent article prepared for a symposium
on "constitutional fidelity." In it, he criticizes prominent American constitutional theorists, including Laurence
Tribe and Antonin Scalia, for their respective concerns with the framers' views and, more generally, with fidelity.
Interestingly, Dworkin moves back and forth from discussions about the American Constitution to analysis of the
moral constitution of which our Constitution is an imperfect archetype. Michael McConnell shrewdly contrasts
Dworkin's occasional remarks concerning the constraining role of history with his more thoroughgoing fidelity to
a "right answers" thesis. See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in JudicialReview: A Comment
on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution,65 FORDHAM L REV. 1269 (1997).
92. The effort to develop prescriptive theories of legal interpretation into which the architecture of
constitutional interpretation can be folded is not something what is characteristic of philosophical approaches.
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more contextualized, even American exceptionalist, approaches, is the connection
between American constitutional theory and other constitutional forms and
experiences.
In describing these approaches thusly, I resist voicing any criticism of their lack
of a sustained comparative approach. On the contrary, there is something utterly
sensible, and even brilliant, in the coherent enterprise of tying normative
constitutional theory to the special legacy of the United States' constitutional
experience. For one thing, the rediscovered relevance of political history in shaping
interpretive approaches is well overdue; we now have an emerging vocabulary with
which to tie together discussions among American historians, political scientists,
and legal scholars.93 At the same time, the tacit injunction of these theorists is for
each constitutional republic to discover and explain its own distinct political
histories and constitutional practices. Close scrutiny of our constitutional practice
will no doubt frame debates about other constitutional systems; there is, indeed,
evidence that American constitutional theory has informed discussion of
constitutionalism abroad. 94 Yet, the location of modern constitutional theory in
distinct American history and politics gives us substantial pause in considering,
without further reflection, whether and to what extent such theory can be applied
fruitfully when we have, as our object of scrutiny, a different constitutional system.
We return, then, to the question: To the extent that both interpretive eclecticism
and neo-originalism confine their focus, as do other clusters of constitutional
theorizing, to debates regarding the United States Constitution, can these theories
be applied effectively to state constitutional practice? Not easily, I would suggest;
that is, not without a sustained, and very contextualized, series of arguments for
their applicability to state constitutional debates. Moreover, it is implausible that,
as currently constituted, these theories will inform sensibly emerging state
constitutional theory in a way adequate to tackle the central state constitutional
debates of the contemporary American republic.
It is my claim in Part I of this essay that the American states have indeed a
different constitutional system. We are all Americans, to be sure; and the
development of state constitutionalism in the period beginning in the late 18th
century and continuing, in periods of ubiquitous constitutional change, to the
present has built, in greater or lesser respects, on the American constitutional
tradition generally.95 But if one is persuaded that the distinct properties of state
constitutionalism represent a form of government and a strategy of political
decisionmaking significantly removed from the creation of our national
constitutional system, then we ought to be wary of translating prescriptive
constitutional theory of the sort described above into state constitutional practice.
It is telling, in this regard, that few coherent attempts at such translation have been
made. On the contrary, mainstream constitutional theory remains nearly exclusively
a nationalenterprise. Even supposing that the reasons for this lie not in deliberate

93. See KALMAN, supra note 62; RAKOVE, supra note 25.
94. See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER (1992); JON ELSTER & RUNE SLAGSTAD,
CONSTTUTIONALiSM AND DEMOCRACY (1988); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
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choice but, rather, in a combination of inadvertence, elitism, and specialization of
interest, I would suggest that there are, in fact, good reasons to resist at least the
wholesale adoption of federal constitutional theory into state constitutional
discourse.
The discussion thus far has focused on what is essentially a negative proposition,
that is, the idea that federal constitutional theory is not obviously relevant to issues
of state constitutionalism. We are left, though, with a large question: What are the
sources, then, of our nascent state constitutional discourse? Is there not a version
of, say, constitutional eclecticism, neo-originalism, or some other pieces of theory
which can help guide state constitutional discourse? This is the question addressed
in the final part.
1I. STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM REVISITED: IS THIS A DIFFERENCE
WITH A DIFFERENCE?
As noted in the introduction, there is both a weak and a strong case to be made
on behalf of state constitutional theory as an independent normative enterprise. The
weak case has been traced out, for the most part, in the previous two Parts. Therein
I considered how state constitutionalism has distinct processes and histories, and
how these distinct processes point to a more distinct theoretical project. While there
are, to be sure, important common elements in the national and state designs, the
evolving experience of state constitutional formation, along with the different stakes
raised by the inter-governmental dynamics of state constitutions as documents of
limit as opposed to the United States Constitution as a document of grant, at least
raise the question whether the template of national constitutionalism is the
appropriate one when questions arise in the context of state constitutional law.
Moreover, given the preoccupation of modem constitutional theory with federal
issues, a salient question is whether the context-laden thrust of constitutional theory
as developed in mainstream scholarship has much to teach us about state
constitutionalism and the issues therein raised. Again, though, this analysis merely
raises questions concerning the largely uncritical connections between national and
state constitutionalism. The objective of this last Part is to elaborate more fully the
case for a distinct constitutional theory. My claim is that the stakes and operation
of state constitutionalism raise distinct questions; accordingly, there are reasons to
think more systematically about whether and to what extent we require a coherent
state constitutional theory, with particular, context-laden principles and practices.
A.

State Constitutionsin the FederalSystem
It might be tempting to ask the question of whether, if we were concerned with
crafting an American federal republic from scratch, we would design a system in
which states could adopt their own, separate constitutional arrangements and, in
turn, a uniquely state constitutional discourse. This question is especially pertinent
in light of serious critiques of modem American federalism and, in particular, of the
role of states and state law in an increasingly nationalized system of law and
politics. Malcolm Feeley and Ed Rubin, for example, go so far as to argue that states
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and the modem American federalism are both anachronistic." If we are concerned,
they argue, to preserve the values associated with decentralized decentralization, we
have available both the theoretical vocabulary and practical architecture to
implement more systematically a structure of decentralized policymaking.97 Hence,
there is nothing intrinsically valuable in preserving states qua states or the
correlative constitutional principle of federalism.9"
Yet, this is exactly the wrong starting point for a theoretical discussion of
American constitutionalism and state constitutional discourse. States constitutions
99
flourish in light of, and not despite, the American constitutional system.
Notwithstanding the enduring struggle over the scope of the national government's
power and, relatedly, the prerogatives of states and their so-called "reserved"
powers under the United States Constitution's Tenth Amendment,"° the basic idea
that states enjoy wide latitude to govern their own economies and their own citizens
is essential. Significantly, states and their constitutions have not been collapsed into
the federal government and the national constitutional system. 011
This does not mean, of course, that the scope of state power under their
respective state constitutions is without limit. For example, states are significantly
restricted in their ability to act in ways that impose externalities on other states and
governmental units."°2 The message of the dormant commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause is that state regulation must coexist with the
constitutionally imposed environment of free trade and free and equal movement
of goods and persons. °3 State decisionmaking is, after all, subject to the general,
national imperative of equal citizenship and interstate mobility. "° Moreover, the
pervasive rights enshrined in the Bill of the Rights and of the Reconstruction era
amendments creates an elaborate, fundamental series of restrictions on the
"freedom" of the states to protect their own interests at the expense of the American
polity."0 5 This is at the very least what it means to live in a united states, and not
merely a confederation of essentially sovereign polities.
These limits imposed by the national constitution are interstitial, however. States'
latitude to act within the domain of their (geographical, political, and legal)
boundaries represents the baseline; limits imposed by the national constitution
represent the exceptions, the side constraints on the general freedom of state action.
It could not be otherwise, given the premise of American constitutionalism that the
federal government is one of limited, delegated powers. To be sure, given the wide
parameters of national power in late 20th century America, we can be forgiven for
96. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 42. See also Rubin, supra note 48.
97. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 42, at 910-26 (discussing decentralization and federalism). See also
SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 79-91.
98. See SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 14-57. See also Rubin, supra note 48; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 42.
99. See Sager, supra note 3.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
101. See Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 156-62; Vem Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights? 45 WASH. L.
REV. 454 (1970).
102. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 50, at 1515-20.
103. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401-545 (2d ed. 1988).
104. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionisn Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
105. See id.; TRIBE, supra note 103.
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taking occasionally for granted the enduring principle of limited government that
underlies American constitutionalism. °6 The federal government has, after all, only
those powers delegated to it under the national constitution; all other powers are
reserved to the states.
It is critical to note that what is being reserved is not individual freedom, and,
thereby, a defeasance to private ordering, but in fact powers.'0 7 Reserving powers
to "states or respectively to the people" makes clear that, at least so far as the
national constitution is concerned, the prerogatives of the states and their political
units to exercise power within their domains is not the business of the national
government." 8 Moreover, the states' primary role represents not only the theory of
the American constitutional order, but also the reality of this order. States in fact
regulate all types and manners of public and private decisionmaking. State
constitutions, and the intrastate laws enacted in their shadow, are the most common
elements of American public governance. State constitutional systems of varying
scope persist in every state; no state cedes its own regulatory authority to the
national government, although each could conceivably do so in order to surrender
its own prerogatives to the protective power of the national government.
These, then, are the twin predicates of the state constitutional systems within the
United States: First, the United States Constitution preserves to the states the power
to create and enforce their own constitutions as charters of government for the
citizens within the states; second, each state has accepted this power and has
constructed a system of intrastate governance and public authority tailored to the
particular circumstances of its state systems. In light of these brute facts, it makes
little sense to invest ourselves in considering whether state constitutions make sense
in a world of multiple boundaries and shifting spheres of administrative and
economic conveniences. 0 9
While it follows that each state is to be left to its own devices in shaping its own
constitutional discourse, it does not follow that each state ought to fashion its
independent, separate theory of state constitutionalism. On the contrary, there are
sound reasons for developing a comprehensive-let us call it "transstate"-constitutional theory which can help orient constitutional discourse
throughout the United States. What is called for in the end is a balance: States can
106. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L REV. 1231 (1994).
107. Reserving to the states the right to exercise these powers, however, does not guarantee that the states
will in fact exercise any particular powers. The states may, in the end, cede their authority to private citizens within
their domain. The more interesting question is whether the national constitution's framers created a system of
government, and a constitutional philosophy, which made it more or less likely that states would exercise their
discretion not exercise certain powers. On the one hand, James Madison cautioned against the accomplishment of
certain "wicked objects" by the state, including the overregulation of private property and the abridgement of
contractual rights, suggesting that state power was at least as fearsome as national power. See THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (James Madison). See also THOMAS PANGLE, THE SPRT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988). On the other

hand, Article IV requires the states to guarantee to their citizens "a republican form of government," suggesting
that the framers expected the states to govern, and to exercise some amount of powers, rather than merely to cede
decisionmaking prerogatives to individual citizens. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
108. To the extent that this expresses a constitutional principle, it does not matter whether and to what extent
the United States Constitution's framers themselves shared a view about the proper content of state constitutions.
What is critical is that they did not express a view within the national constitution. See WOOD, supra note 17, at
469-615.
109. But see Rubin & Feeley, supranote 42; Rubin, supra note 48.
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develop independent discourse to account for their own, distinct constitutional
traditions; at the same time, states can build upon a more general, trans-state
constitutional discourse. After all, states share in common a set of constitutional
objectives.
B.

Comparing ConstitutionalPredicamentsand Objectives
Modem constitutional theory aims at excavating and explaining the purposes and
principles underlying American constitutional ideology." ° As a contextualized
enterprise, this ideology is profoundly shaped by-and, in the neo-originalist
schema, beholden to-the ideas and theories of the founding framers at their key
moments in time."' This ideology is shaped, as well, by close scrutiny of the objects
of the American constitutional design.
It is impossible to understand American constitutionalism more generally without
engaging the dilemmas and predicaments posed by the very task of designing "the
machine that would go of itself.""' The predicament which overshadowed all others
was how to design the structural provisions of the constitution to ensure,
simultaneously, a proper distribution (and separation) of powers among the
branches of the federal government and also between the national and state
government.' Serving both these aims, if imperfectly, was the essential principle
of limited government. No principle is more significant to the apparatus of
American constitutionalism than that principle. And yet the maintenance of limited
government requires giving up to some fundamental extent the use of the national
constitution as a positive instrument of governance and public policymaking.'"
To the extent that the national government's powers are restricted to a domain
created by the Constitution's broad charter, there will necessarily remain a range of
positive actions and regulatory instruments that remain off limits to the national
government. This is so notwithstanding the temptation to reconstitute the
Constitution, especially through the device of implied powers, into an engine of a
far-flung national police power. It is tempting to reconfigure national constitutional
discourse in just this way, since the needs of modem American society are so
pressing, so intractable, and, in many ways, requiring a comprehensive, national
response. Yet, the principle of limited, delegated power which lies at the foundation
of American constitutionalism requires us to resist scrupulously these
temptations." 5 The United States Constitution has limited objectives. And
constitutional theory, in its various shapes and sizes, is tethered to these
fundamentally limited objectives.

110. See generally LAWRENCE A. ALEXANDER, CONsTroNALSM: PHILOSOpincAL FOUNDATIONS (1997).
111. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 91, at 1278-79; BeVier, supra note 80. See generally supra text
accompanying notes 15-38.
112. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1986).

113. See, e.g., Lance Banning, The PracticableSphere of a Republic: James Madison, the Constitutional
Convention, and the Emergence of Revolutionary Federalism,in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONs'rmUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 162 (R. Beeman, et al. eds., 1987).
114. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONALISM (1990).

115. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388
(1987). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-57.
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By contrast, state constitutions have much broader objectives. State constitutions
are, as noted above, documents of limit rather than grant. State governments may
act, through their police powers, to regulate, to govern, to tax, and in these ways to
fulfill a myriad of social, political, and economic objectives within their
jurisdictions." 6 State powers are not limitless." 7 Not only do states commonly limit
the scope of governmental action under the domain of their respective state
constitutions, but the national constitution through, among other devices,"' the
guarantees of individual rights, cabins exercises of state police power. This is all
besides, of course, ubiquitous political constraints on the regulatory initiatives of
state governments. But, as a fundamental theoretical matter, it is critical to sort out
the objectives and strategies available to state governments under their
constitutional systems and those more limited objectives characteristic of the
national constitution.
When federal decisionmakers run up against the limited objectives of the national
constitution, their only legitimate remedy is to find, in the Constitution, authority
to implement their agendas. Of course, the United States Constitution has proved
rather capacious with regard to these federal strategies." 9 The leitmotifof American
constitutionalism during the two most momentous eras in constitutional
development"2 was successful legal adaptations, through the impetus of courts and
legal doctrine, in order to sanction assertions to broad federal authority.'' The key
move was, after all, the Court's decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland,22 and its
imprimatur on the notion that federal power may rest not only on expressly
delegated authority, but also on authority implied from powers delineated in the
Constitution. 23 Yet, however significant this icts of modulation, notice that they
represent doctrinal innovations. They are all the product of judicial approving of
national initiatives, approvals which have not undermined the principle of limited
government but, rather, have settled arguments (mostly, through not completely, in
favor of the national government) regarding the nature and scope of delegation.
The corresponding dilemma in state constitutionalism looks different when we
recall the principle underlying the exercise of state governmental power under the
24
constitution, which is that state constitutions are documents of limit, not grant.
Although judges are still called upon to decide questions concerning the scope of
those limits, the opportunity for state decision-makers to act without the need to

116. By "state power to act" here, I mean to include, too, the exercise of power by sub-state units such as
municipalities and special districts. Indeed, the ability to rely upon these created sub-state units is a key feature of
the states' capacity to accomplish social, regulatory objectives.
117.
118.

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text. (discussing the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. L § 8,

cl. 3, and Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1).
119. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (constricting states' Tenth
Amendment powers via Court's expansive reading of the Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).

120. The two eras to which I refer are Reconstruction and the New Deal.
121.
122.

See TRIBE, supra note 63, ch. 5. See also ACKERMAN, supranote 29, at 99-104.
17 U.S. 316 (1819).

123. See id. at 353.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
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convince courts to find authority "in" the state constitution is, by any measure,
greater than their counterparts in the federal government. As a consequence, public
policymaking in state government is, on the whole, a much richer, expansive, proactive enterprise than the national government, even under a very broad
construction of what is "necessary and proper," constitutionally.
This may well have to do with the greater capacity of smaller governmental units
to act aggressively;125 or it may represent a certain distribution of functions either
acquiesced in, or deliberately designed, by national politicians who are, after all,
responsible for dealing with more inherently national issues such as foreign policy.
There is a structural explanation as well for this divergence of policymaking
activism: State constitutions preserve to state decisionmakers the power to act
energetically, without jumping through certain hurdles as contrasted with the
national government's domain, which, at least as a theoretical matter, is limited by
design. 2 6
The comparative structure of constitutional delegation and limits is well
illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's two recent decisions in New York
v. United States 27 and Printz v. United States. 12 Both cases involved federal
statutes which required states to implement federal law through the deliberate use
of state political institutions in the manner described in the federal legislation. The
situation in New York was that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act'29
required the state, when certain circumstances were triggered, to enact legislation
in order to take title to certain radioactive waste facilities. 30 In Printz, the Court
considered the Brady Handgun law' 3 and a provision in it which required local
sheriffs to carry out registration responsibilities.'32 In both cases, the Supreme Court
struck down the federal government's attempts to, in the words of the Court,
"commandeer" the states' legislative and administrative processes where such
efforts aimed to conscript states and local governments into the service of national
regulatory objectives.' 33 The principal problem with this arrangement was this:
Conscripting state and local officials into the service of national objectives rendered
these decisionmakers vulnerable to the perception that it is the state and local
governments, and not the feds, who are pursuing these initiatives.I Voters can be
expected to punish, as it were, the "wrong" decisionmakers, thus undermining the
constitutionally salient values of representative government.'3 5 While the national

125. See VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, chs. 6,7 (1991). See also SHAPIRO,
supra note 42, at 82-85.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
127. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
128. 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997).
129. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986).
130. See New York, 505 U.S. at 149-54.
131. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
132. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
133. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
134. See Printz 117 S. Ct. at 2382; New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
135. Notice how the "accountability/representation" argument described in Garcia stands New York/Printz
on its head. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Therein the Court insisted that
states would be adequately represented in the national political process and, therefore, no independent, enforceable
constitutional right located in the 10th amendment is necessary to safeguard states' interests. See id. at 551.
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government retained wide power, under their commerce and spending powers, to
impose their regulatory objectives, 3 6 they could not blur the accountability line by
using state and local officials to do their bidding. 37
If the issue were to arise at the state constitutional level, by contrast, it is
unquestionable that the state legislature would be free to commandeer local
governments and their elected representatives in just the same manner as was
disapproved by the Court in New York and in Printz. This is so, notwithstanding the
fact that the accountability concern is exactly the same. The reason for the different
result reflects the structural distinction between national and state constitutionalism
described above: States have not only a broader scope of regulatory powers, but
they have, correspondingly, a large arsenal of regulatory strategies.Indeed, the
device of enforcing state commands through local officials is an ordinary and
uncontroversial element of state regulatory decisionmaking.
The only rationale available to distinguish the doctrine of New York and Printz
from the undoubtedly opposite result in the imagined state/local context is that the
federal government is a government of limited, delegated powers. These limits
entail restrictions on not only the subjects which the federal government may seek
to regulate under its (broad) powers, but they also entail substantial restrictions on
the regulatory methods available for the exercise of power. States' essential
constraints follow from their own constitutional principles; yet, it is unlikely that
states would constrict themselves in ways similar to the federal government. It is
much more probable-and here we return to the subject of distinctive constitutional
objectives-that states will allow themselves the latitude to adopt appropriately
flexible regulatory instruments to tackle policy issues. The dependent relationship
of local governments on state design reflects this latitude, as does the fundamental
principle of state police power.' 38
Contrasting the limited capacity of national political institutions under the U.S.
Constitution with the energy and activism available to state institutions under state
constitutionalism may put an excessively positive spin on state constitutionalism.
It is worth remembering that constructing our national constitution around a sphere
of limits and constraints was a profoundly wise decision. Not only was there value
in the decisions of the framers to limit the risk of national aggrandizement of power
and reduction in citizen's liberties, but the creation of "limits" was, as Chief Justice
Marshall shrewdly explained in M'Culloch v. Maryland, to be understood as part
of a constitution, a charter of practical, adaptive governance.'39 Moreover, the label
of activism attached to state constitutionalism as I have described it has also a
Presumably if that analysis is correct, then there is little worry about state/local accountability in the New
York/Printz context; after all, states can manifest their concerns with respect to accountability in their negotiations
involving the original federal legislation. Or at least this is the logic of the Court's Garcia argument. Of course,
a more mundane, but critical, difference between the analysis in Garcia and in New York is the alignment of the
Court. Justice O'Connor, in her Garcia dissent, rejects the representation argument proffered by the majority. See
id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The accountability argument fleshed out in New York follows from this
rejection.
136. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911 (1995).
137. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633
(1993).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
139. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. 316,407 (1819) ("it is a constitution we are expounding...").
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negative, or at least cautionary, connotation. The presence of a state police power
risks empowering state governments to trample on individual liberty both directly,
through the broad assertions of governmental authority over decisions otherwise
made by individuals and free markets, and indirectly, through the curtailment of
local, community-based processes of decisionmaking in favor of more centralized,
statewide action."4 In short, we have in hand, when considering national and state
constitutionalism, a double-edged sword. The opportunities for sound governance
as shaped by state constitutions' real and potential objectives are cabined by the
national constitution in a way more draconian than in state constitutions. At the
same time, limits of the sort represented by our tradition of national
constitutionalism have the advantage of channeling wisely federal authority; and the
inherent grant of power to state governments has the disadvantage of risking
dangerous expansions of state authority in the name of "policing" undesirable
private conduct. 4"
C.

Toward a Distinct State ConstitutionalDiscourse
The preceding discussion has highlighted, through a comparative analysis of the
structure of powers under the federal and state constitutions, the different
predicaments facing these two levels of government under their respective
constitutions. In this section, I consider how the particular dilemmas facing state
governments may influence the project of developing a distinctive discourse of state
constitutionalism.
1. Incentives and constitutional design
The objectives of state governance are achieved primarily through the
instrumentalities of state and local political institutions. While the state constitution
governs these choices, the broad latitude of authority entrusted to these political
institutions by state constitutionalism means that most of these choices entail
judgments about how best to pursue policy aims-in other words, the domain of
politicalchoice overshadows the domain of legal authority. Yet, to the extent that
state political institutions are subject to the overriding commands of their respective
constitutions, there is important room left for legal limits in the form of
constitutional restrictions. The prudent course for state constitutional architects
would be to create the sort of incentive structure that would feasibly preserve the
essential prerogatives of state action-and, thereby, the advantages of proactive,
energetic policymaking-while checking the temptation of the state to disregard
local and individual interests in the name of fulfilling the interests of the state qua
state or of individual state legislators.
To be sure, the interest in creating proper incentives is not unique to state
policymaking. Surely, James Madison had exactly this issue of incentives and

140. See supra text accompanying notes 128-136.
141. For example, if we return to the "commandeering" scenario described supra in the text accompanying
notes 127-38, we can see that with the states' greater latitude to act comes a greater threat not only to individuals'
liberties but also to the structure of representative government and political accountability which underlies, at the
broad level of democratic political theory, both national and state constitutionalism.
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power in mind when he described the values of separation of powers in the 5 1st
Federalist paper. 142 Yet, the particular concern with incentives structure in
connection with state constitutional design is the result of, first, the absence of any
coherent federalism-like arrangement which would safeguard the institutional
interests of sub-state units in a state constitutional system,143 and, second, the
absence of a principle of limited government which would, as designed and as
enforced by courts, impose a special, ex ante, burden on the state government to
describe reasonably precisely the constitutional authority for their actions.'"
Therefore, one element of a distinct constitutional discourse at the state level is
the development of a constitutionally embedded incentive structure which would
function to check state political decisionmakers in their pursuit of energetic
policymaking and would correspondingly empower sub-state political units, such
as local governments, to participate in policy decisions and to provide their own sets
of checks on the exercise of power by state institutions.
The advantages of such a incentive-based constitutional discourse would be twofold: First, creating proper incentives would enable state governments, and the
implementation mechanisms upon which states rely to carry out their policy
agendas, to more effectively accomplish their multifaceted aims. Given the uniquely
broad latitude with which states are entitled to operate through their police powers,
the function of incentives are both to limit states to a range of appropriate, just
actions-a need especially acute insofar as we are wary of the self-interested
motivations of political decisionmakers 4 5 -and also to channel state and local
decisionmaking into optimal, efficient patterns. Even as we are realistic about law's
capacity to shape political decisionmaking and institutional behavior, we can hold
out hopes that a carefully designed, independent state constitutional theory will aid
us in developing these incentives.
There is a second advantage associated with an incentive-based constitutional
theory. That is, it can create the set of conditions and legal/political environments
in which states can more successfully compete and collaborate in an interstate
economic marketplace. 46 The growing interdependence of states has been well
described in the political economy literature; and much attention has been lavished
on the increasing globalization of commerce. 147 However, it is important to
remember that, with respect to a nation like the United States, economic regulatory

142. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51. (James Madison). See generally GARRY WIis, EXPLAINING AMERICA:
THE FEDERALIST 95-175 (1981) (explaining THE FEDERALIST No. 51 and comparing it to Alexander Hamilton's
vision of government in THE FEDERALIST No. 78).
143. See supra text accompanying note 109.
144. This point raises an immensely large set of issues concerning the relationship between constitutional
structure and political incentives, issues which are mostly beyond the scope of this essay. Cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez,
The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,52-56 (1994) (questioning whether
the framers deliberately created such a system, and analyzing how the legislative branch should act in the wake of
the Constitution's all too frequent silences).
145.

See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmcAL

INTRODUCrION 12-37 (1991) (describing behaviorist assumptions underlying public choice theory of legislation).
146. See SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 76-88. See generally THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
COMPETrION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990).
147. See generally Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L REv. 1441
(1994); Laurence T. Aurbach, Federalism in the Global Marketplace, 26 URB. LAW. 235 (1994).
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strategies must account not only for the decisionmaking processes of the national
government, but also for the processes of the fifty state governments. The most
common set of legal strategies for dealing with the inefficiencies of federalism,
namely, the barriers on mobilized, national action associated with the fifty-headed
behemoth of the states, is centralization and command-and-control.' 4 The problem,
as traced in the relevant literatures, is not only with coordination difficulties, but
also with what is perceived as a deleterious set of incentives on the part of the
states. 149 There are utterly sensible reasons for, in the appropriate circumstances,
following command-and-control strategies and thereby to replace state initiatives
with a nationally designed competition policy. That was, after all, at the heart of the
dismantling of the Articles of Confederation over two centuries ago.'
At the same time, little attention has been paid to the capacities of state
constitutions to adapt, through a scheme of properly designed incentives, their own
mechanisms to deal with the increasingly important interstate and international
marketplace. I offer no serious reflections on the precise contours of this interstate
marketplace, except to note that, whatever its descriptive and normative dimensions,
states' capacities to participate successfully (and on behalf of their citizens) in this
market turns profoundly on the shape and implementation of their fundamental law,
their constitutions.
2. Constitutional forms and functions
To consider more carefully what such an incentive structure might look like, let
us return to the constitutional relationship between state and local governments
under state constitutions. The potential for exploitation of local communities or, to
put it less melodramatically, the disregarding of local interests in the name of
statewide concerns, exists because the absence of any sovereignty-like protections
for local governments.' 5 ' This lack of protection is not an historical oversight or a
peculiarity of contemporary urban politics; rather, it is a concomitant of the
principle that local governments are no more nor less than creatures of state
government. 52 This is as it should be. Nonetheless, a state constitution ought to
preserve some sphere of decentralized decisionmaking, if only to yield the
significant economic and social advantages associated with such decentralization."'
Perhaps, as well, such decentralization could preserve more noninstrumental,

148. See generally ALICE RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES, AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1992).

149. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 34-50. One especially interesting strand of the debate over state
versus federal control has concerned the so-called "race to the bottom" in environmental law. For different
perspectives on this question, compare Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictionsin EnvironmentalLaw, YALE L & POL'Y REVJYALE J.
ON REG. 67 (1996) (symposium issue) and Richard B. Stewart, Pyramidsof Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism
in MandatingState Implementation of EnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L. 1196 (1977) with Richard L Revesz,
RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor FederalEnvironmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
150. See, e.g., BEER, supra note 49, at 244-78.
151. See Gn.LETTrE, supra note 5, at 301-47; Terrence Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under
Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,48 MINN. L REV. 643 (1964).
152. See supratext accompanying notes 42-45.
153. See supratext accompanying notes 145-50.
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communitarian values, values which were certainly championed by at least a
segment of the framers' generation, and, more recently, by a wealth of democratic
theorists concerned with local democracy and self-government. These values
include the development of creative, original mechanisms for the expression of
citizen preferences in local decisionmaking. They might also include the articulation
of distinct municipal rights, and also the pursuit of unique protectionist goals with
respect to the community's natural and built environment, goals which would,
again, be appropriate if generalized to the inter-local and statewide level, but goals
which might adapt especially well to local communities.'
The key to this preservation of local power, albeit in the shadow of the complete
legal dependence of local governments on state action and the corresponding
control of local decisionmaking by state political institutions, lies in the sensible
construction of political and economic incentives, along with the careful design of
appropriate legal safeguards. One device, however imperfect in practice, for the
accomplishment of these aims is the principle of municipal home rule, which was
developed in order to maintain a sphere of local prerogatives in the area of "local
affairs" and therefore to ensure, through the operation of state constitutional law,
some degree of decentralized decisionmaking.5 6
Another incentive related constitutional device is the power of the state to
delegate certain lawmaking and law adjudication powers to regulatory agencies and
bureaus. Such delegation at the federal level has long been countenanced as part of
the national government's sphere of "necessary and proper" commerce power.5 7
Delegation at the state level has been more of a mixed bag-ironically, given the
greater sphere of state power under their constitutions-with courts crafting
different standards for gauging constitutionally appropriate delegations. If anything
is clear from this admixture of state "delegation" decisions is that state courts have
not developed a persuasive constitutional theory, either particular to their own state
constitutions or more generally, to sort out proper from improper delegations. Part
of the task in developing such a theory, I would suggest, is to consider what scheme
of constitutional delegation is most consistent with the two aims described
above-facilitating sound intrastate governance, and contributing to the states'
respective capacities to compete and collaborate in an interstate economic
marketplace. Delegation of power, as part of the enterprise of regulatory
strategizing, would seem to be connected strongly to both of these aims. 8 The task
of a distinct, trans-state constitutional discourse would be to shape a delegation
"doctrine" suitable for the particular dilemmas facing state government.
154. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996); Jerry Frug,
Decentering Decentralization,60 U. CI. L. REV. 253 (1993).
155. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Supremacy, Local Sovereignty: Reconstructing State/Local Relations
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Because much of the preceding discussion has been preoccupied with structural
issues, I have not said much about the role of individual rights protections under
state constitutions. Such protections are undoubtedly critical. They function, as does
the Bill of Rights in the national constitution, as fundamental limits on the power
of government to deprive individuals of essential liberties and freedoms. And, as in
the nation generally, these protections are enforced in each of the fifty states by
courts equipped with the power of judicial review. Courts are also, however,
equipped with their own, respective theories of constitutional interpretation. It is in
the development of these theories that state constitutional theory which takes state
constitutionalism seriously as a distinct enterprise is imperative. Given the absence
of the principle of limited government in the state constitutional system, the
responsibility falls even more squarely than at the federal level on judges to
articulate the scope of individual rights and to enforce their protections against state
and local encroachment. The other side of the ubiquitous police power is, of course,
the risk that states will, in the name of active, energetic government, trample on
citizens' liberties. Moreover, to the extent that constitutional protections under the
federal constitution are limited-as Justice Brennan argued powerfully in his call
twenty years ago for a state constitutional renaissance' 59-state enforcement of
individual rights in an independent, and even "activist" fashion, is especially
appropriate." At the same time, disagreement will likely continue to rage
concerning the proper scope of individual rights under state constitutions; yet, the
point is not to resolve squarely these disagreements but, rather, to suggest modestly
that discussions about the state constitutional interpretation of individual rights and
liberties ought to proceed within the context of a distinct, sophisticated state
constitutional theory. The challenge, after all, is for states to design a system in
which their citizens both construct their body of essential individual rights and
and political structure for the protection through the rule of law of
maintain a legal
16
these rights. '
Each one of these incentives structures I have described above are ideal types.
If we were to consider in detail how these principles and doctrines play out in the
practice of state constitutionalism in the fifty states, I suspect we would identify
some systems as reasonably effective in structuring incentives, with others deeply
dysfunctional. I do not offer here any extended explication or defense of these
devices in practice. Rather, the aim of this discussion, as with this essay generally,
is to offer some concrete examples of how a distinctive state constitutional theory,
one which is attentive to the particular predicaments of state governance, would
tackle certain legal conundra. Each of these devices has an analogy of sorts in
federal constitutional law, so we might compare municipal home rule to federalism,
insofar as both constitutional principles aim to explain the dimensions of the
1 62
relationship between layers of government in a constitutional democracy.
Additionally, the principles concerning the proper delegation of legislative power
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also resonate in national constitutional law where the delegation doctrine exists to
limit the scope of national legislative power. 63 However analogous these federal
constitutional doctrines and principles are, they fail to describe accurately the nature
of the state constitutional dilemmas to which the state doctrines and principles
respond. Home rule is not the same as federalism; not only is the history and context
distinct, but these two principles respond to fundamentally different political and
economic circumstances."6 Moreover, they exist in distinct constitutional
universes.6 6 Rather than straining the analogies in order to connect extant
constitutional theory to the state constitutional enterprise, we would do better to
think more independently and creatively about how a more distinct constitutional
discourse would make sense of these dilemmas and doctrines.
D.

State Constitutionalismand InterstateDifferences: Contrasting
ConstitutionalProjects
A dominant theme of this essay has been the difference-between national and
state constitutionalism-and its consequences. One is entitled to ask, then, why I
stress the virtues of a coherent state constitutional theory rather than, say, a
California constitutional theory, a New Jersey constitutional theory, a New Mexico
constitutional theory, and so on. Surely, states are entitled not only to their own
distinctive state constitutions, but are also entitled to arguing for a particularized
state constitutional theory which is tailored to local needs and circumstances.
However, states have similar objectives in governance; moreover, they face similar
dilemmas and require fundamentally similar incentive structures. What it means to
be a state political system within the structure of the American republic is to face
a collection of predicaments and to tackle a common set of policy issues.6
Let me begin with the most abstract version of the argument for a trans-state
constitutionalism. Each state in our union ought to be seriously responsible for
addressing systematically and efficiently the needs and demands of its citizens.
Notwithstanding discrepancies in wealth, size, geography, location, and political
structure, we believe that there are agendas which ought to be-not as a federal
constitutional matter, but as a general normative matter nonetheless-part of the
processes of state governance. One of these agendas is the construction of a state
economy which enables citizens and businesses to participate in both intrastate and
interstate market, as consumers and as producers. 67 Other agendas include the
provision of basic human security, such as protection against crime and natural
disasters, and also the provision of a system of private law which enables a system
of property rights and enforcement of contracts, and a system of legal redress for
torts and invasions of other legally cognizable interests. While we might
163. See generally Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhom & Glenn 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation,68 CORNEL L REv. 1 (1983).
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legitimately quarrel over the scope of these necessary agendas, so long as we
believe that there are certain responsibilities which the states and their respective
systems of government owe us as a matter of just and efficient social policy, then
one of the objects of a constitutional theory which has salience across the fifty
states is to provide a means of facilitating, through constitutional design, doctrine,
and principles, the carrying out of these responsibilities.
There is a second, and very different reason to insist upon a trans-state
constitutional theory. This pertains to the dynamics of interstate competition and
policymaking. Once again, we need to recall the fundamental structure of the
federalist system. Each state is entitled not only to govern within its borders, but it
is also expected to compete with other states in an interstate economic marketplace.
This expectation lies at the heart of the framers' construction of both free trade and
competitive equality principles in the U.S. Constitution of 1787.16 The free trade
principle is, of course, manifest in the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8.
Whatever other values the commerce clause serves in a national, and now global,
economy, its basic aim was, as articulated well in the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions,'69 to ensure a system of free movement of goods and persons and,
overall, a system of free trade. The equality principle is embodied in the Privileges
and Immunities clause of Article IV. 7 While the equivalent clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"' has, through the device of incorporation, been construed
to protect the equality of individuals more generally, the original Privileges and
M-along with the commerce clause, 73 part of the
Immunities clause of 1787 72
structural protections of the Constitution-safeguards equality in order to facilitate
the equal opportunity of citizens in all fifty states to pursue economic and social
advantage regardless of where they reside and to where they travel. Both principles
express the framers' fundamental interests in creating the conditions of a flourishing
economic marketplace, one in which citizens' key representatives-the states and
their political organs---can pursue their political and economic aims in this market,
subject to the pursuit by their state competitors of their own aims.'
In the end, though, the case for a trans-state constitutional theory is only as strong
as the theory itself. The task described in this essay is to develop principles and
doctrines appropriate for addressing the distinct elements of state constitutionalism.
Within state constitutionalism are common themes and also important differences.
As a positive and normative project, state constitutional theory must keep squarely
in mind whether and to what extent differences in states call for particularity and
functional context, rather than for general principles and rules. My suspicion,
though, is that the cluster of issues which emerge within states' legal and political
systems at this time in our history raise similar stakes and have more or less similar
shapes. The prospects for state constitutional theory, then, remain as strong as do
168. See Regan, supra note 104.
169. See ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 272-81 (1935)
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these similarities and common contexts. The case for centralization in the national
government has long rested on versions of the slogan "we are all in the same boat
together." Perhaps paradoxically, this slogan also undergirds the quest for a
comprehensive, trans-state constitutional theory, theory which addresses our
collective aspirations as citizens of our respective communities, states, and the
nation.
III. CONCLUSION
Constitutional theory is a key part of the project of creating legal rules and
principles in order to implement our vision of constitutionalism in the United States.
While this enterprise has, in its eclectic elements, been preoccupied with the United
States Constitution, there are different challenges facing those of us preoccupied
with state constitutional law and with the relationship among levels and layers of
government within a state constitutional system. We are interested in how our states
confront challenges concerning regulation, politics, institutional design, and social
and economic goods and services.'75 Moreover, we are interested in how state
constitutionalism as a more or less coherent theoretical apparatus addresses
ubiquitous questions of institutional design and competence. The descriptive
questions concern what we see, and what we think about what we see, when we
look into state constitutional forms; the normative question concerns how to make
the system work better. So, however quaint sounding these questions are to the ear
of folks steeped in federal constitutional discourse, they are real and enduring when
considered through the lens of state constitutionalism.
The questions are real and enduring because of qualities characteristic of state
constitutions and their particular and general histories. These qualities are distinct
from our federal constitution in ways that make our attention to the intersections of
positive constitutionalism and prescriptive theory pertinent; and these distinctions
help shape the domain of normative theory within which our efforts are carried out.
The objective of this essay is to provide some traces of a framework within
which we can think creatively about state constitutional theory. I have considered
the case for a distinctive state constitutional discourse and described, in broad
outlines, a few of the key issues which such a discourse will need to engage. There
are sound reasons to believe, with James Gardner, that state constitutionalism has
to now been a "failed discourse." There are equally strong reasons to believe,
however, that these failures have been failures of imagination.
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